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CHRISTOPHER J. BORGEN*

Imagining Sovereignty, Managing Secession:
The Legal Geography of Eurasia's "Frozen

Conflicts"

The world we have to deal with politically is out of
reach, out of sight, out of mind. It has to be
explored, reported, and imagined.
-Walter Lipmann'
INTRODUCTION

The interrelated concepts of sovereignty, selfdetermination, and the territorial integrity of states form a
Gordian knot at the core of public international law. These
concepts encompass not only how we define the classic
actors of the international system-states-but also how
seriously international law takes claims of civil and
Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
This Article benefited from the comments and suggestions of Lori
Outzs Borgen and Mark Meyer. I am also grateful for the comments of
participants from Oregon Review of InternationalLaw's conference
Complexities of Scale: The Role of the Subnational in International
Law (Mar. 16, 2007), including conference organizer Hari Osofsky,
Keith Aoki, Tayyab Mahmoud, Peggy McGuinness, Michelle
McKinley, and Judith Wise. I am also grateful to the editors and staff of
The Oregon Review of International Law for their fine editorial work.
Any mistakes are solely my own.
1 Alan K. Henrikson, The Power and Politics of Maps, in
*

REORDERING THE WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 2 1 ST
CENTURY 94 (George J. Demko and William B. Wood, eds., 2d ed.

1999) (quoting Walter Lipmann).
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political rights. This Article considers how geographic
concepts can be used to try to untangle-or slice throughthis knot of issues.
The frozen conflicts of Eurasia are a series of ongoing
secessionist crises in the post-Soviet states of Moldova,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan. I will use the example of the socalled "frozen conflict" in Moldova as a central illustration.
Part I is a discussion of how we "imagine sovereignty"-using techniques of political geography and cartography to
designate sovereignty and how this affects our perception
of claims. Related to this, I consider how "territory" is
both a physical thing-a plot of land-and also an
ideological concept-an idea of a homeland. Part II briefly
sets out the evolution of the concept of self-determination
and how it is used to regulate legal claims for secession.
Part III further examines the theory of self-determination
through the optic of the conflict in Moldova. This part will
also consider the "legal geography" of secessionist
enclaves. Part IV will situate these legal arguments in the
broader discourse of realpolitik,including whether and how
these issues relate to the debate over the final status of
Kosovo. Finally, Part V considers implications of these
findings and addresses arguments that perhaps it is time to
reorder the international system around something other
than states.
The frozen conflicts have been considered intractable in
part because it is very difficult to find negotiated solutions
on purely political bases.
Realpolitik has its limits.
Perhaps seeing these conflicts through the optic of
international law, and that the contested territory has a legal
geography as well as a political geography, may provide a
framework in which, based on the norms of the
international community, some claims will be favored and
others viewed as weak. The challenge is to use the norms of
self-determination not merely to protect the prerogatives of
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states but also to envision a means towards principled and
just resolutions of these, and similar, conflicts.
I
MAPS AND STATES: IMAGINING SOVEREIGNTY

States and sovereignty are a leap of the imagination. In
the early 191h century British Foreign Minister Lord
Castlereagh said that Italy was no more than a
"geographical concept," and that its unification into a
single state was "unthinkable." 2 But people dared to think
the unthinkable and Italy, Germany, and other such
previously fanciful notions are now well-established states.
The modem state has been at the center of the
international system since the Peace of Westphalia ended
the Thirty Years' War in 1648. Westphalia codified the
doctrine in the European state system that no entityemperor, pope, or other decision-maker-was above the
level of the state. The state became the main actor in the
international system and also the pinnacle of the hierarchy
of power.
The Westphalian system that developed was not only
about vertical hierarchies of power, but also about
horizontal relations among states, affecting notions of
territory, space, and jurisdiction. Sovereignty included full3
and exclusive authority over the territory in question.
Each state was the supreme authority within its territory
and had no right of action within another's territory.
In the wake of Westphalia, then, territory became
increasingly compartmentalized. Consequently, "[i]n world
2 PETER WATSON, IDEAS: A HISTORY OF THOUGHT AND INVENTION,

FROM FIRE TO FREUD 663 (2005) (quoting Lord Castlereagh).
3 Santiago Torres Bemrdez, Territorial Sovereignty, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

Bernhardt ed., 2000).

LAW 823, 826

4
(Rudolf
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politics space can only be divided between actual states and
states-in-making." 4 And so the goal of many national
movements has been to become recognized states.
Although there is no single text that explains what is
required to be a "state," the 1933 Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States, better known as the Montevideo
Convention, sets forth a series of benchmarks which are
generally accepted in the international community.5 The
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States gives the modem synopsis of the requisites of
statehood:
Under international law, a state is an entity that has
a defined territory and a permanent population,
under the control of its own government, and that
engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal
relations with other such entities.6
With this focus on territory, the language of
international law and the language of political geography
overlap. As one geographer put it:
The world is actively spatialized, divided up,
labeled, sorted out into a hierarchy of places of
greater or lesser 'importance'
by political
4 JOHN AGNEW, GEOPOLITICS: RE-VISIONING WORLD
POLITICS I1

(2d ed. 2003).
5 The state as a person in international law should possess
the
following qualifications:
a) a permanent population;
b)a defined territory;
c) government; and,
d)capacity to enter relations with other states.
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 U.N.T.S. 19.
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES

§201 (1986) [hereinafter

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
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geographers, other academics and political leaders.
This process provides the geographical framing
within which political elites and mass publics act in
the world
in pursuit of their own identities and
7
interests.
The symbols of cartography-hard lines, dotted lines,
and the like-are used in an attempt to graph borders and
jurisdictions, to image sovereignty, to take its picture, via
mapping. In attempting to portray the image of sovereignty,
we are also trying to imagine the existence of a sovereign
entity, a state, and its area of control.
But the Westphalian system is now being challenged
and, moreover, maps can be misleading. Journalist Robert
Kaplan, reflecting on his travels through the Caucasus,
Northern Iraq, and West Africa, noted that he began to
"develop a healthy skepticism toward maps, which, [he]
began to realize, create a conceptual barrier that prevents us
from comprehending the political crack-up just beginning
to occur worldwide."
This Article is about understanding how concepts from
geography inform legal norms concerning one aspect of
this "political crack-up": secessionist conflicts. We will
first look at international law concerning self-determination
9
and then apply these rules to the conflict in Moldova.
7 AGNEW, supra note 4, at 3.
8

ROBERT D. KAPLAN, THE COMING ANARCHY: SHATTERING THE

DREAMS OF THE POST COLD WAR 38 (2000).
9 This Article in part draws from a report of which

I am the principle
author, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist
Crisis in Moldova. See, Special Committee on European Affairs,
Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in
Moldova, 61 REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK 196 (2006) [hereinafter Bar Report]. A differently paginated
version is available at http://www.abcny.org/Publications/record/vol_
61 2.pdf. In late May 2005 the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, through its Special Committee on European Affairs, sent a
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II
BLOOD AND SOIL: MANAGING SECESSION

A. The Evolution of Self-Determination
Self-determination is one of the most-often invoked and
least understood concepts of international law. The norm of
self-determination gained international prominence in
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. Since then it has had a
tumultuous existence, ranging from post-World War
decolonization to post-Cold War ethnic conflicts. Writing
the concept of "self-determination" into the UN Charter
caused the idea to evolve from a principle to a right without
ever fully defining the underlying concept.' 0 According to
Hurst Hannum of the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, self-determination in the 1960's was simply
another term for decolonization. 11 However, even at this
legal assessment team to the Republic of Moldova, including
Transnistria. The mission was led by committee chair Mark A. Meyer,
a member of Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., and consisted of: Barrington D.
Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Court Judge for the Second Circuit;
Robert Abrams, partner at Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP and former
Attorney General of the State of New York; Elizabeth Defeis, Professor
of Law and former Dean of Seton Hall University Law School; and me.
In preparing the report we met with and interviewed over forty
policymakers and diplomats from
Moldova, (including
the
Transnistrian separatist leadership), Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and the
United States. We also met with representatives from various civil
society groups and other interested parties.
'0 Patricia Carley, Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial
Integrity, and the Right to Secession, Reportfrom a Roundtable Held in
Conjunction with the U.S. Departmentof State's Policy PlanningStaff,
United States Institute of Peace (Peaceworks paper no. 7; March 1996)
at 3.
"i d. Thus, as Hannum explained in a 1996 roundtable held by the
U.S. Institute of Peace and the Policy Planning Staff of the Department
of State, the idea of self-determination during this time was not that all
peoples had a right to self-determination but rather that all colonies had
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point "self-determination did not allow for secession;
instead, the territorial integrity of existing states and most
colonial territories was assumed."' 12 The rhetoric of selfdetermination then changed in the period from the late
1970's until today, in which the Wilsonian discourse
concerning the ethnic and cultural rights of minorities was
mixed with the territorial concerns of the era of
decolonization.' 3 While there is still controversy as to what
this norm is and is not, there is a basic consensus from
which we can draw conclusions.
In sum, the basic norm of self-determination is the right
of a people of an existing state "to choose their own
political system and to pursue their own economic, social,
and cultural development."' 14 It is not a general right of
secession. 15
The concept of self-determination is actually comprised
The default rule is
of two distinct subsidiary parts.
a right to be independent.
12 Id. at 4. See also the discussion of uti possidetis infra notes 25
through 28.
13Carley, supra note 10, at 3.
14 Daniel Thurer, Self-Determination, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 364, 367 (R. Bernhardt, ed. 2000). See also IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 553 (6th ed.

2003) (stating that the right to self-determination is "the right of
cohesive national groups ('peoples') to choose for themselves a form of
political organization and their relation to other groups.").
15 See, e.g., Thurer, supra note 14, at 367 (stating "[t]he principle of
self-determination does not seem to include a general right of groups to
secede from the States of which they form a part."). The US Institute
for Peace/Department of State roundtable stated that the right to selfdetermination must be separated from right to secession and the
establishment of independent statehood. Carley, supra note 10, at vi.
State practice in the cases of Tibet, Katanga, Biafra, and Bangladesh
supports the view that states have not recognized such a right of
secession under customary international law. Thurer, supra note 14, at
367-68.
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"internal self-determination," which is essentially the
protection of minority rights within a state. As long as a
state provides a minority group the ability to speak their
language, practice their culture in a meaningful way, and
effectively participate in the political community, then that
group is said to have internal self-determination. Although16
self-determination was mentioned in the U.N. Charter,
and in article 1 of both the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant and the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Covenant, 17 jurists even in the last decade have found that
"international law as it currently stands does not spell out
'8
all the implications of the right to self-determination."'
Nonetheless, the International Court of Justice's ("ICJ's")
Western SaharaAdvisory Opinion confirms "the validity of
16 Article

1, paragraph 2 of the Charter states:

Article I
The Purposes of the United Nations are: ...

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace;
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
17 Both Covenants have the following language in each of
their first articles:
Article I
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
U.N. Doc. A/6316; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and

Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, UN Doc. A/6316.
18 Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission
Opinion No. 2,
31 I.L.M. 1497, 1497 (1992) [hereinafter Badinter Commission]. The
Badinter Commission was organized by the E.C. to sort through the
legal issues concerning the status of Yugoslavia and its possible
successor States.
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the principle of self-determination" under international
law. 9
The assumption is that such a pursuit of economic,
social, and cultural development would occur under the
auspices of an existing state, and would not require the
establishment of a new state. This conception of internal
self-determination makes self-determination closely related
to the respect of minority rights.2z
In some instances, though, aggrieved groups claim a
"right of secession." No such "right" exists under
international law. Actually, international law is silent as to
secession, which is viewed as a matter of domestic law and
politics, not international law. 2' The general view is that
separation from a state as a method of self-determination is
a legally-sanctioned solution only in the context of
decolonization. 2
19 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-33 (Oct.
16). See also Legal Consequencesfor States of the ContinuedPresence
of South Africa in Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J 16, 31 (June
21) and Case Concerning East Timor (Port. V. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90,
102 (June 30); BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 554 n. 121.
20 Furthermore, modern views of self-determination also recognize
the "federalist" option of allowing a certain level of cultural or political
autonomy as a means to satisfy the norm of self-determination. Daniel
Thurer, Self-Determination, 1998 Addendum, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 364, 373 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).
21 PATRICK DAILLIER & ALLAIN PELLET, NGUYEN Quoc DINH'S
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, sec. 346, 500 (1994), ("la s6cession
n'est pas prise en compte en elle-m~me par le droit international.").
22 Report of the Group of Experts Concerning the Territorial Integrity
of Quebec in the Event of the Attainment of Sovereignty, at sec. 3.07,
available at http://www.tamilnation.org/selfdetermination/
countrystudies/quebec/quebec2.htm [hereinafter Quebec Commission].
The Commission consisted of Thomas M. Franck, Murry and Ida
Becker Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Studies,
New York University School of Law; Rosalyn Higgins, Q.C.,
Professor, London School of Economics, member of the Human Rights
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However, some jurists argue that in certain extreme
cases, even outside of decolonization, there is the
possibility of a privilege of "external self-determination,"
or secession from a state. This is "the subject of much
debate., 23 Whether and how a group may secede from an
existing state-put more bluntly, when a country may be
dismembered-is a politically charged question that goes to
the heart of the stability of the modem state system. The
answer given in particular examples is often driven by the
national interests of the states involved. For example, as
will be discussed below, the EU member states that
disagreed with the EU's general policy for recognizing
Kosovar sovereignty were countries that themselves had
domestic concerns of secession (such as Spain, Cyprus, and
Romania) and/or a good diplomatic relationship with
Serbia (for example, Romania).
Notwithstanding the political context of state practice
concerning self-determination and secession, there are
nonetheless legal principles that have been expounded in
cases and incidents such as in the report of the international
commission of jurists asked to arbitrate the attempted
secession of the Aaland Islands in 192 1,24 the Badinter
Commission; Alain Pellet, Professor of Public Law at the University of
Paris X-Nanterre and at the Paris Institut d'tudes politiques, member
of the International Law Commission of the United Nations; Malcolm
N. Shaw, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Leicester; and
Christian Tomuschat, Professor, Institut fir V61kerrecht, Bonn
University, President of the International Law Commission of the
United Nations. (Insitutional affiliations listed were those at the time of
the work of the Quebec Commission.)
23 MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW

In the

1 7 th century

271, n. 140 ( 5th ed. 2003).

the Aaland Islands were administratively part of
Finland, which in turn was part of the Kingdom of Sweden. In the 19th
century Sweden ceded Finland, including the Islands, to Russia. In
1917, Finland declared independence from Russia during the course of
the Russian Revolution. At this time the Aaland Islanders, who were
nearly all Swedish, sought reunification with Sweden. Finland and
24
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Commission opinions concerning the former Yugoslavia in
the 1990's, the Canadian Supreme Court opinion
concerning Quebecois self-determination, as well as from
other examples of state practice. The central question is
one imbued with the languages both of law and of political
geography: what is the relationship between political
boundaries and the right of self-determination?
State practice shows that self-determination, properly
understood, does not allow the redrawing of boundaries.
During the Yugoslav War, the Conference on Yugoslavia
Arbitration Commission, better known as the "Badinter
Commission," established by the European Community,
found that the exercise of self-determination "must not
involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of
independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the states
concerned agree otherwise."2 5 This is reiterated in Opinion
3, which notes that uti possidetis has become recognized as
a "general principle" of international law. 26 The Helsinki
Final Act also provided for inviolability of borders,
although it does allow for border changes if through
peaceful means and based on an agreement. 27 The

Sweden brought the case to the League of Nations, who in turn referred
the case to a Commission of Jurists to assess the legal issues. The two
opinions issued by the Commission, one concerning applicable law and
the other on substantive results, have become very influential in
questions of self-determination and secession.
25 Badinter Commission, supra
note 18.
26 Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration
Commission Opinion No. 3,
31 I.L.M. 1499, 1499 (1992).
27 Pal Kolsto & Andrei Edemsky with Natalya Kalashnkova, The
Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism, 45 EUR.-ASIA
STUD. 978, 978 (1993). See also Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki, 1975, Principle 3 (1975)
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf.
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affirmation of the principle of uti possidetis
is found in a
28
treaties.
and
decisions,
declarations,
host of
However, although self-determination does not allow
for the redrawing of boundaries, this does not mean that
secession itself is illegal as a matter of international law.
James Crawford argues that "[i]t is probably the case that
the use of force by a non-State entity in exercise of a right
of self-determination is legally neutral, that is, not regulated
by international law at all (thought the rules of international
humanitarian law may well apply)., 29 Secession is merely
treated as a fact: it either has occurred or it has not. It is not
a matter of international legal regulation and it is not a
matter of right. Thus, there is no right of secession.
However, some argue that there may be a possibility of
a "legal" secession in certain extreme cases. These views
are based on an interpretation of the Friendly Relations
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force Apr. 24, 1964); Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 62 UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679; Vienna Convention on the
Succession of States, 72 A.J.I.L. 971, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3; Constitutive
Act of the African Union, art. 4(b), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15; G.A.
Res.1514, para. 6, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (Dec.14, 1960); and declaration of the UN World
Conference on Human Rights in 1993. List adapted from C. Lloyd
Brown-John, Self Determination and Separation, POLICY OPTIONS 42
(September 1997).
As for uti possidetis in judicial opinions, the ICJ had written in
Burkina Faso v. Mali that utipossidetis:
is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific
system of international law. It is a general principle which is
logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of
independence, wherever it occurs.
Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 1986
I.C.J. 554, 565 (Dec. 22).
28

29 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 135-36 (2d ed. 2006).
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Resolution of the UN General Assembly, a special
resolution that was passed at the twenty-fifth anniversary of
the founding of the United Nations to restate the basic
principles of the organization. The resolution excludes
secession as a means of forming a sovereign state when the
existing state respects equal rights and the selfdetermination of peoples, but some have interpreted it as
implying that secession may be a legal privilege when a
state does not respect internal self-determination.3 ° For
example, in re Secession of Quebec, the advisory opinion
issued Supreme Court of Canada on the issue of secession,
the Canadian court found that "[a] right to external selfdetermination (which in this case potentially takes the form
of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises only
in the most extreme cases and, even then, under carefully
defined circumstances..."31
Based on this interpretation, any attempt to claim a
privilege of secession-that is, where secession trumps uti
possidetis-must at least show that:
(1) the secessionists are a "people;"
(2) the state from which they are seceding seriously
violates their human rights; and
(3) there are no other effective remedies under either
domestic law or international law.
In the Secession of Quebec opinion, the Canadian
Supreme Court noted that the meaning of the term
30 Declaration on Principles

of International Law

Concerning

Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, U.N.
Doc. A/5217 (Oct. 24, 1970); see also Christine Haverland, Secession,
in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 354, 355 (Rudolf

Bernhardt ed., 2000).
31 Reference re: Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 123
(1998) [hereinafter Secession of Quebec].
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"peoples" is "somewhat uncertain." 32 At various points in
international legal history, "people" has been used to
signify citizens of a nation-state, the inhabitants in a
specific territory that is being decolonized by a foreign
power, or an ethnic group. The definition of "people" from

the time of decolonization, "the entire population within a
state," was meant to support the existing state system by
essentially making the term co-terminus with the state
itself.33
By contrast, in recent state practice the term "people"
has often been used to refer to an ethnic group, or a
"nation" in the classic, ethnographic, sense of the word.3 4
Equating the term "people" with "nation"

has been

criticized by some for being too restrictive, as it is difficult
to show that a group is the near totality of an ethnic nation.

Others have argued that defining people based on ethnicity
opens too many possible arguments for rights of selfdetermination, such that concerns for international stability
led states to deny that there was a right of self35
determination to ethnic groups within colonial territories.

32

33

Id.

See Guntram H. Herb, National Identity and Territory, in NESTED

IDENTITIES 12, 12 (David H. Kaplan & Guntram H. Herb eds., 1999).
34 The Aaland Islands report also added that, for the purposes of selfdetermination, one cannot treat a small fraction of people as one would
a nation as a whole. The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to
the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of
Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B7/21/68/106 (1921) [hereinafter
Aaland Islands 1921 Report]. Thus, the Swedes on the Aaland Islands,
who were only a small fraction of the totality of the Swedish "people"
did not have a strong claim for secession in comparison to, for
example, Finland, when it broke away from Russian rule since Finland
contained the near totality of the Finnish people.
31 See ANTONIO

CASSESE, SELF DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A

LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 73 (1995).
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Consequently, various commentators have attempted to
reframe the analysis by defining the idea of "the selfdetermination of peoples" on non-ethnographic terms.
Professor James Crawford of Oxford argues that the "units"
to which the principle of self-determination applies can be
best understood by not focusing on the term "people," but
on the idea of territory. He writes:
The units to which the principle applies are in
general those territories established and recognized
as separate political units; in particular it applies to
the following:
(a) trust and mandated territories, and territories
treated as non-self-governing under Chapter XI of
the [UN] Charter;
(b) States, excluding for the purposes of the selfdetermination rule those parts of States which are
themselves self-determination units as defined;
(c) other territories forming distinct politicalgeographical areas, whose inhabitants are arbitrarily
excluded from any share in the government either of
the region or of the State to which they belong, with
the result that the territory becomes in effect; with
respect to the remainder of the State, non-selfgoverning; and
(d) any other territories or situations to which selfdetermination is applied
by the parties as an
3
appropriate solution.
The second requirement for a possible claim of a
privilege of secession, after showing that the claim is being
made on behalf of a "people," is that the claimants can
show serious violations of their human rights by the preexisting state. The Aaland Islands report actually stated this
principle in the negative; the Commission explained that its
36 CRAWFORD,

supra note 29, at 127.
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finding that there was not a right to secede did not include
the case of "a manifest and continued abuse of sovereign
power to the detriment of a section of population."3 7 It is an
unfortunate fact that human rights abuses exist in every
country and that in many countries such abuses are serious
and pervasive. However, it is exceedingly rare for the
international community to ratify a secession, regardless of
the reason upon which it was based. Consequently, we
must give a narrow reading to the idea of "serious
violations of human rights" in the context of secession.
Third, those claiming secession as a legal right must
show that there are no other options under either domestic
or international law. The Aaland Islands Commission, for
example, found that if secession and subsequent
incorporation into Sweden was the only means of
protecting the rights of the Islanders, then this would have
been a solution, but there were, in fact, other means of
protecting their rights.38 More recently, the Canadian
Supreme Court wrote in re Secession of Quebec that there
may be a rule evolving in international law that "when a
people is blocked from a meaningful exercise of its right of
self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort,
to exercise it by secession." There are two points worthy of
emphasis: first, that the Canadian Supreme Court did not
come to a conclusion that such a rule actually existed, it
simply noted that some have argued that there is such a
rule. And, second, even if this rule did exist, secession
would only be allowed as a last resort.
37 Report of the InternationalCommittee of Jurists Entrusted by the

Council of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory
Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question,
League of Nations Official J., Spec. Supp. No. 3, 5, 5-10 (1920)
[hereinafter Aaland Islands].
38 Thurer, supra note 14, at 367, citing to Aaland Islands 1921
Report, supra note 34, at 22-23.
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B. Geography and External Self-Determination
Thus, secession is disfavored as a method of addressing
self-determination. While the 1975 Helsinki Final Act
mentioned self-determination, it also reiterated that
territorial boundaries were inviolable. 39 Similarly, one of
the first acts of the Organization for African Unity was to
issue a resolution to respect borders at the time of
independence.
Consequently,
claims
for
selfdetermination that are most likely to be viewed as legally
legitimate must not only pay respect to peoples but to
borders.
Secessionist entities that are able to point to some
previously existing boundaries to which they will conform
have claims that are more likely to be viewed as legally
legitimate. By analogy, one can look to the claims that were
made in the wake of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The
leaders of Bosnia and Croatia could claim that their new
states conformed to pre-existing administrative boundaries
that had been within Yugoslavia. This was viewed as more
legitimate than the claims of the Krajina Serbs, which had
no pre-existing boundaries and were essentially a grouping
of ethnic communities within Croatia.
This move from ethnographic argument to geographic
argument is made all the more explicit in Crawford's fourpart formulation.
Thus, in an attempt to impose a bright line rule on the
messiness of ethnic conflict and separatism, the
international community gives weight to cartography and
political geography. Being able to show a delineation on a
39 Bradford L. Thomas, InternationalBoundaries: Lines in the Sand
(and the Sea), in REORDERING THE WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL

PERSPECTIVES ON THE 2 1sT CENTURY 72 (George J. Demko & William
B. Wood, eds., 2d ed.1999).
40

Id. at 70.
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map may not be dispositive of a claim for external selfdetermination, but it helps. This is a rule that favors the
cohesion of states and disfavors claims purely made on
issues of ethnic identity or "nationhood" (in the classic,
ethnographic, sense). Some would argue that a better rule
would be the reverse, one in which the aspirations of
peoples for a homeland were favored instead of
maintaining the status quo order of states. I will turn to the
broader question of what type of rule is desirable in Part
IV. Before discussing that issue, though, I want to apply
the existing legal framework to the separatist crisis in
Moldova by way of example of how geographic concepts
are deployed to manage claims of secession.
III
THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF SECESSIONIST ENCLAVES:
LESSONS FROM THE TRANSNISTRIAN CASE

A. The Frozen Conflicts of Eurasia
Although the dissolution of the USSR in late 1991 was
a generally peaceful event, it nonetheless sent tremors
throughout Eurasia. The geopolitical quake in Eurasia was
most pronounced in the Russian "near abroad," the ring of
newly independent states that surround Russia. No longer
republics within the USSR, they were now fully sovereign
states having to muster their own (much diminished)
resources to address the various domestic ills that befell
them. Some of these states found that they had to contend
with dissatisfied groups who did not "buy-in" to the new
state or who yearned for the USSR, or who wanted their
own state as well. Thus, there arose separatist problems in
Moldova (Transnistiria) and Georgia (Abkhazia and South
Ossetia), as well as the long-term conflict over NagornoKarabakh in Azerbaijan. Although each of these conflicts
has its own unique causes and set of ongoing dynamics,
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they are generally called the "frozen conflicts" of Eurasia,
referring to their supposed intractable natures and that they
have persisted for many years without much hope of

resolution. 41
The Georgian conflicts and Nagorno-Karabakh have
received relatively more attention in the West than the
Moldovan conflict. Located between Romania and Ukraine,
with a majority of ethnic Romanians, Moldova is the
poorest country in Europe.42 At issue is who should control
a strip of land between the Nistru River (also known as the
Dniestr River) and the border of Ukraine. Variously called
Transnistria, Trans-Dniester and, by Russian speakers,
Pridnestrov'ia, this region is less than 30 kilometers wide,
with 4,118 square kilometers in total area, making it
roughly the size of Rhode Island. Transnistria has a
population of approximately 580,000, while the rest of
Moldova has 3.36 million inhabitants. Nonetheless,
Transnistria
contains
Moldova's
key
industrial
infrastructure, power plants, and, importantly, a significant
stockpile of Soviet-era arms. Since 1994, it has been under

41 Dov Lynch of the European Union Institute argues that the term

"frozen conflict" is somewhat misleading because the situation in
Moldova (and in the other conflicts typically described as frozen
conflicts) has actually been quite dynamic. Dov LYNCH, ENGAGING
EURASIA'S SEPARATIST STATES: UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS AND DE
FACTO STATES 42 (2004). 1 use the term here in recognition that,

although the situation has evolved in significant ways, the overall result
is no closer to substantial resolution as of this writing than it was in
1992.
42 The Soviets, however, labeled this population as ethnically
"Moldovan", and asserted that they were not ethnically Romanian. The
USSR also called the Romanian language "Moldovan", and
underscored this by outlawing the use of the Latin alphabet and
requiring the use of Cyrillic letters. Although the reason for this
nomenclature was political, rather than ethno-linguistic, it was carried
over by the current Moldovan government after independence.
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the effective control of a separatist regime that calls itself
the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic ("TMR").
The Transnistrian conflict will provide an optic through
which we can analyze the rules of self-determination and
the role of geography on the definition and application of
these rules.
B. The History of the TransnistrianConflict
The region in which Moldova is located is a crossroad
of cultures. Historically, the west bank of the Nistru River
was called Bessarabia. "Transnistria" referred to the east
bank. Prior to the Soviet period, Transnistria "was, at an
even deeper level than in Bessarabia, a classic borderland
where ethnic identities were fluid and situational, and
where Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian, Jewish, and German
influences combined to create a mixed culture.' 43 Unlike
Bessarabia, Transnistria was not part of traditional
Romanian territory. From the ninth to the fourteenth
centuries Transnistria was part of Kievan Rus' and GaliciaVolhynia.44 Bessarabia was once a part of an independent
Moldovan state that emerged briefly in the 15th century
under Stefan the Great, but subsequently fell under
Ottoman rule in the 16th century. After the Russo-Turkish
War of 1806-12, Bessarabia was ceded to Russia, while
Romanian Moldova (west of the Prut River) remained in
Turkish hands. Transnistria was also part of Russia, but
was in the districts of Podolia and Kherson.
During the upheaval of the Russian Revolution,
Bessarabia announced independence as the Moldavian
Democratic Republic and subsequently sought unification
with the Kingdom of Romania.
43 CHARLES KING, THE MOLDOVANS: ROMANIA, RUSSIA, AND
THE
POLITICS OF CULTURE 181 (2000).

44Id.at 179.
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By the mid-1920's Josef Stalin had been successful in
recapturing for the Soviet Union most of the provinces that
Russia had lost during the revolution. Bessarabia, however,
remained part of Romania. In 1924, Stalin established the
Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (or
"MASSR") as an autonomous province within the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This was spurred by
Moscow's desire to reclaim Bessarabia and attempt to have
a colorable claim to this "Moldavian" territory.45
Transnistria became part of the MASSR. In 1939, the
USSR and Germany signed the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact, which, among other things, provided for the USSR's
annexation of Bessarabia, which had by then been part of
Romania for more than twenty years. In 1940, Romania
was forced to cede Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to
the USSR via an exchange of communications on June 2628, 1940. 46 Stalin merged Bessarabia and the MASSR into
the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (or "MSSR"),
which became the fifteenth republic within the USSR.
While a sense of history is important in any discussion
of Moldovan politics, the current crisis can be traced to
more recent events. Contemporaneously with the events
leading to the fall of the Berlin Wall, from August to
December 1989, the MSSR parliament passed a series of
language laws that made the Moldovan language the
official state language and that also began a transition from
Cyrillic to Latin script.47 On April 27, 1990, the Supreme
Soviet of Moldova adopted a new tricolor flag and 4a8
national anthem that was the same as that of Romania.
45
46

Kolsto et al., supra note 27, at 978.
See Office of the Geographer, Department of State, International

Boundary Study: Romania - USSR Boundary 10 (No. 43 - Dec. 30,
1964), describing the exchange.
47 Kolsto et al., supra note 27, at 981.
48 Case of Ilascu (Ilascu v. Moldova) 311 Eur. Ct.
H.R., at para. 29
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Then, in the summer of 1990, the MSSR declared
sovereignty, changing its status within the USSR.
A group of Russian speakers led by Igor Smirnov, a
factory manager who had come to Moldova in November
1987 to become a director of the Elektromash factory in
Tiraspol, expressed concern that the newly sovereign
MSSR would soon seek reunification with Romania and
take Transnistria along with it.
On September 2, 1990, Transnistria declared its
separation from Moldova and its existence as a republic
within the USSR. Soon after this announcement, separatists
began taking over police
stations and government
49
Transnistria.
in
institutions
Moldova sought independence from the USSR.5° On
May 23, 1991, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic
changed its name to the Republic of Moldova.
On August 27, 1991, the Moldovan parliament, in the
aftermath of the attempted putsch against Gorbachev,
declared that Moldova was an independent republic. By
contrast, Igor Smirnov, the leader of the Transnistrian
separatists, praised the putschists as saviors of the Soviet
state. 5 ' Smirnov, arguing that independence was necessary
to protect the Russian minority in Transnistria from the
possible reunification of Moldova with Romania, rallied the
Transnistrian separatists in the creation of the TMR.
On December 3, 1991, the Soviet 14 th Army occupied
Grigoriopol, Dubasari, Sobozia, Tiraspol, and Ribnita, all

(2004).
49 KING, supra note 43, at 189; see also Kolsto et al., supra note 27,
at 984.
5o Stuart J. Kaufman, Spiraling to Ethnic War, INT'L SECURITY, Fall
1996, at 108, 130-31.
51 KING, supra note 43, at 191.
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of which are in Transnistria. 52 Thus, if the Government of
Moldova wanted to send troops into its cities to prevent any
attempted separation, they could have faced opposition
from Russian troops.
The situation boiled over in the summer of 1992. Much
of the fighting took place in and around the city of Bender.
The 14 th Army, which had been garrisoned in Moldova,
intervened on the side of the Transnistrians and, in part due
to the 14 th Army's positions, the Moldovan Army was
unable to take control of Bender or Dubasari. The fighting
resulted in approximately 1,000 deaths and 130,000 people
either internally displaced or seeking refuge in other
countries. 53 On July 21, 1992, the fighting ended with
Moldova signing a cease-fire agreement that was notably
countersigned 54 by Russia, as opposed to the
Transnistrians.
The result of the Russian intervention was that
Transnistria became effectively partitioned from the rest of
Moldova. The fighting cooled, and was replaced by a
frozen conflict.
As the years since the 1992 war passed, observers
became increasingly concerned that Smirnov and his
associates had no intention of allowing formal reintegration
into Moldova as that might thwart increasingly profitable
smuggling activities. The end of the 1990's saw another
series of attempts to resolve the conflict, including plans for
a federal state and for Transnistrian autonomy within a
52

Case of Ilascu, supra note 48, at para. 53.

supra note 43, at 178.
54 Graeme P. Herd, Moldova & the Dniestr Region: Contested Past,
Frozen Present, Speculative Futures? Conflict Studies Research
Centre, Defence Academy , UK, Central & Eastern Europe Series
05/07 (February 2005) at 4, available at http://www.da.mod.uk/
colleges/csrc/document-listings/cee/.
53 KING,
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Moldovan state, none of which succeeded.55 Russia and, to
a lesser extent, Ukraine were closely involved in the
ongoing situation as "guarantors" of regional peace and
stability.
The U.S. and the EU have also both joined the
Moldova-Transnistria mediation process. The new "5+2"
talks include Moldovan leadership, TMR leadership,
Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE as the main five
stakeholders and the U.S. and the EU as the official
observers.
At this point the TMR is playing a waiting game; as the
then-Chairman of its so-called Supreme Soviet, Grigoriy
Marakutsa said in 2003: "Every year we are getting closer
to our international recognition., 56 As will be discussed
below, the situation in Kosovo (as of this writing) has
affected the public stance of the TMR leadership.
C. The Legal Claims Concerning Sovereignty
For over fifteen years political negotiations have been
unsuccessful at breaking the impasse in the Moldovan
conflict. In 2008, the fundamental positions of the parties
are no different than in 1992: the TMR's leadership wants
to maintain complete control over Transnistria, the
Moldovan government seeks effective reintegration of
Transnistria into Moldova, and the Russians actively and
tacitly support the TMR, at least to the extent of frustrating
Moldova's attempts at reintegration, but without
recognizing the TMR as a sovereign State. An implicit
See, e.g., Memorandum for the Bases of Normalization between
the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria, 8 May 1997, available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/mm/i1997/05/456_en.pdf;
see also
Herd, supra note 54, at 3, referring to agreements "granting further
autonomy and calling for more talks."
56 Herd, supra note 54, at 4.
55
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argument in the New York City Bar Report is that after so
many years of realpolitik not being able to find a way
beyond this impasse, there is the possibility that
international law can provide a means to clarify the
strengths and weaknesses of the parties' positions in
regards to international norms and, perhaps, provide a
framework for fruitful settlement discussions.
1. A People
Before the 1992 conflict, Transistria had an ethnic mix
that was about 40- percent Moldovan/Romanian, 28 percent
Ukrainian, and 25 percent Russian.5 7 There are many
familial ties across the Nistru River. As Pal Kolsto and his
co-authors explain, the conflict was less ethnic than
Christians
killed
Orthodox
internecine:
Orthodox
Christians and ethnic Moldovans, Ukrainians, and Russians
fought on both sides. 58 They argue that it would be a "gross
oversimplification" to call the conflict one between ethnic
Moldovans (or Romanians) and Russophones. 59 One must
remember that "the history of Moldova is one of constant
change and
contestation of territory and so identities and
60
loyalties.,
Consequently, arguing that there is a distinct
Transnistrian ethnicity would be quite difficult. Rather,
TMR leadership argues that the definition of "people"
should be broader than an ethnicity and should be broad
enough to include likeminded groups. TMR "Foreign
Minister" Valeriy Litskai has argued that Transnistria is a
social and cultural region. 6 1 Rather than a single ethnicity,
57 Kaufman, supra note 50, at 119.

58 Kolsto et al., supra note 27, at 975.
59 Id.

60 Herd, supra note 54, at 1.
6' Notes from meeting of May 19, 2005 with Valeriy Litskai
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though, he argues that it is a community of three ethnic
groups. 62 There is some support for saying that
Transnistrians have different political proclivities than
"right bank Moldovans." For example, Transnistria had
already been collectivized in the 1920's and 1930's and
thus was always more "Soviet" than the Bessarabian part of
Moldova.
Even assuming Litskai's formulation that political
proclivities could make a "people," the facts in this case
would not support his claim. Should the simple fact of
having had one part of a population more "sovietized" than
the other all of a sudden mean that they were a different
"people?"
By this logic, East Germans would be a
different people than West Germans. Yet that is not how
the international community approached the issue of the
status of Germany; clearly they are more similar than
different, despite part of Germany having been part of the
Soviet Bloc and the other part of the "West."
It is important to keep in mind that identity is socially
constructed; in pursuing its claim for secession the TMR
has put effort into socializing Transnistrians towards
having a group identity distinct from, and hostile to, the rest
of Moldova. 63 Inasmuch as the leaders of the TMR have
[hereinafter Litskai Meeting Notes].
62 Id.; see also Bar Report, supra note 9, at 241.
63 Transnistrian textbooks, for example, state the following
concerning the 1992 Battle of Bender:
The traitorous, barbaric, and unprovoked invasion of Bender
had a single goal: to frighten and bring to their knees the
inhabitants of the Dnestr republic... However the people's
bravery, steadfastness, and love of liberty saved the Dnestr
republic. The defense of Bender against the overwhelming
forces of the enemy closed a heroic page in the history of our
young republic. The best sons and daughters of the people
sacrificed their lives for peace and liberty in our land.
This is Charles King's translation of a passage from N.V. Babliunga
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socialized children and adults into believing that they are a
people separate from those across the Nistru, it would not
be surprising if there was a sense of "othemess" by some in
Transnistria in comparison to the rest of Moldova. But this
alone does not equate to a valid claim for secession.
It has been consistently held that, as the Commission of
Jurists stated in Aaland Islands, there is no right of national
groups to separate by the simple expression of a wish.64 For
example, the Aaland Islands Commission found that the
ability to choose fate by plebiscite must be decided by the
state itself (in this case the Republic of Moldova);
otherwise such a formulation would infringe upon the
sovereign right of states. 65 Thus states, as opposed to
nations (or peoples) are favored.
2. Serious Violations of Human Rights
The TMR leadership proposed three sources of serious
violations of human rights by Moldova:
(1) violations of linguistic, cultural, and political rights;
(2) the brutality of the 1992 War; and
(3) the denial of economic rights.
Taking into account the significant changes in Moldova
since 1992, none of these claims is convincing today.
First, regarding cultural and political rights, since the
and V.G. Bomeshko, Pagini din Historia Plaiului Natal (Pages from the
History of the Fatherland) 98 (Tiraspol: Transnistrian Institute of
Continuing Education, 1997), see Charles King, The Benefits of Ethnic
War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States, 53 WORLD
POLITICS 524, 544 (2001).

Aaland Islands, supra note 37. Note that here the assumption is
the existence of a national group -usually meaning an ethnicity, rather
than simply a like-minded group.
65 Id.
64
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end of the 1992 War Moldova has improved its respect of
minority rights. Moldova's human rights track record has
had its share of setbacks-press freedoms are narrow, for
instance. However, it is nonetheless more respective of
human rights than the TMR: in the 2004 Human Rights
Country Report for Moldova, the State Department wrote
that "[t]he Government [of Moldova] generally respected
the human rights of its citizens; however, there were
problems in some areas, and the human rights record of the
Transnistrian authorities was poor." 66 Thus, it is difficult
for the TMR's leadership to make a credible claim that
formal secession is required due to Moldova's human rights
abuses when the TMR itself has a comparatively poor
human rights record throughout the territory it controls,
including a lack of due process, persecution of religious
minorities, and retaliation against political dissenters.
As for the 1992 War, the heart of the Transnistrians'
claim can be summarized as "We Transnistrians did not go
into Moldova to fight, they brought the battle to us." 67 In
particular, claims have centered around the fighting in and
around Bender. The fighting was, for a time, quite fierce,
with a total death toll on both sides of about one
thousand.68 Litskai explained that the real issue, though, is
that due to the bad feelings that still exist, there is no
guarantee that the war could not flare up again in the
future.69
The Transnistrian argument is not persuasive. This is
66

U.S. DEP'T OF ST., 2004 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA (2005) [hereinafter
Moldova 2004 Country Report], http://www.state.gov/g/dr/rs/hrrpt/
2004/41697.htm.
67 Notes from meeting of May
19, 2005 with Igor Smirnov
[hereinafter Smirnov Meeting Notes].
68 KING, supra note 43, at 178.
69 Litskai Meeting Notes, supra note 61.
PRACTICES
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not to belittle the fact that one thousand people died, but
rather to recognize that the international community sets a
high bar as to what can justify dismembering a state.7 0 This
recognizes a reality of international politics: there is a deep
aversion to allowing secession. In light of this, an argument
that a single battle fifteen years ago should be dispositive in
a claim for secession today flies in the face of state
practice, particularly when one takes into account that the
current human rights situation in Moldova is much
improved and there is very little ethnic tension.
War by its nature is brutal. But not all wars-actually,
as a matter of state practice, very few-lead to accepted
claims of a right to secession. If they did, the world would
be rife with secessionist conflicts. The 1992 Battle of
Bender and its related skirmishes do not rise to the level of
such a war.
70

Consider Biafra. The Biafran attempt to separate from the rest of

Nigeria from 1967-1970 was in part (if not mostly) due to ongoing
violence by the government of Nigeria against the Igbo people who live
in Biafra. Yet, for the nearly one million people that died in that
secessionist conflict, the Republic of Biafra was recognized by only
five states: Tanzania, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Zambia, and Haiti.
Those states that did recognize Biafra as a new state often focused on
the brutality of the conflict. See David A. ljalaye, Was "Biafra" At Any
Time a State in InternationalLaw?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 551, 554 (1971).
The brutality of the conflict was used as a reason for accepting
secession: Tanzania explained its recognition was in part due to the real
and well-founded fears of the Biafrans based on previous pogroms
against them; Gabon and Zambia had similar explanations, though
more focused on brutality of the civil war.
Yet, although other countries (notably Portugal, France, and Israel)
assisted the Biafrans, no other state recognized the secession. The
Organization of African Unity, for its part, strongly supported Nigeria
and the norm against the dismemberment of states. The emperor Haile
Selassie of Ethiopia said that "[t]he national unity and territorial
integrity of member states is not negotiable. It must be fully respected
and preserved." Id. at 556.
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Finally, the economic rights claim, which was actually
about allocation of tax revenues, does not lead to a legal
right to dismember a state. 7' This argument is really about
policy, not the form of a polity.
Besides these observations, it is also important to note
that there is a general sense among commentators,
opinions, and decisions, that the human rights violations
that are cited in support of a claim of secession must be
ongoing violations. Although Moldova still has many
possible pitfalls on its road to becoming a fully modem
democratic state, it is clear that it is nonetheless traveling
the road in the right direction, albeit with some fits and
starts. Thus, the second prong-ongoing serious violations
of human rights-is not met.
3. Availability of Other Options
The third prong asks whether there are any other
options available besides secession. The conflict in
Moldova has been frozen not so much because there are no
other options under domestic and international law besides
secession, but because the separatists have chosen to make
the conflict seem intractable by repeatedly refusing any
options short of effective sovereignty for the TMR.72 For
example, while Moldova has sought to decrease ethnic
tensions, the TMR has attempted to exacerbate them and
subsequently claim that separation is necessary in order to
avoid ethnic conflict and possibly genocide. Such "gaming
the system" is not persuasive
In summary, there is no solid basis for a claim of
secession as a matter of right. First of all, it is generally
believed that no such "right to secession" exists as part of
the right of self-determination. And, even under theories
71
72

Bar Report, supra note 9, at 249-50.
id. at 250-52.
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that may allow for a privilege of secession under extreme
circumstances, the most basic requirements for such a
claim are not met here. The bar may seem high, but the
rules of international law are pragmatic in this case.
Secession is a serious undertaking. In order to prevent a
general breakdown of the state system, it must be a last
resort.
D. The Law and Politicsof Recognition
As a fallback position, the TMR's leadership has
argued that even if the TMR did not have a legal claim to
self-determination, it should nonetheless be recognized as a
state as (according the them) it meets all of the criteria for
statehood.73 The extent to which a new state is able to
participate in the international community is, in practice,
largely determined by the extent of its bilateral
relationships with other states, which, in turn, depends
primarily on its recognition by them. 74 By recognizing a
state, the recognizing state gives its opinion that the new
state meets the requirements under international law for
statehood. When recognition is withheld,
the position of the
75
entity in question can be in doubt.
73 In 2000, Vladimir Bodnar, the chair of the Security Committee of
the Supreme Soviet of the TMR, complained:
We are an island surrounded by states... What defines a state?
First, institutions. Second, a territory. Third, a population.
Fourth, an economy and a financial system. We have all of
these!
LYNCH, supra note 41, at 43. Note Bodnar's replacement of "the

capacity to engage in formal relations with states" with "an economy
and financial system" in his description of the criteria for statehood.
74 i LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW §39,
129
(Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
OPPENHEIM].

75 See, Jochen A. Frowein, Non-Recognition, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Thus, in the rules for recognition, geographic ideas
once again play an important role. In this case, the issue of
whether or not a territory is "defined" is of crucial
importance. The idea of "defined territory" favors groups
that have effective control over territories with clearly
defined boundaries. So, for example, this can assist the
claim of the TMR while it disfavors, for example, the
claims for statehood of ethnic diasporas or even groups that
may have an ethnographic "footprint" in a region (such as
the Kurds) but that that footprint has no clear borders or
edges.
However, while the geographic concept of territory is a
necessary ingredient towards recognition, it is not enough
in and of itself.76 There is no obligation to recognize the

TMR, even if it does have effective control of territory.
LAW 627 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992).
Recognition itself is not a formal requirement of statehood. Rather,
recognition merely accepts a factual occurrence. Thus recognition is
"declaratory" as opposed to "constitutive." Nonetheless, no state is
required to recognize an entity claiming statehood.
76 Effectiveness in fact should not be confused
with legality as a
matter of right.
The principle of effectivity ... proclaims that an illegal act may
eventually acquire legal status if, as a matter of empirical fact,
it is recognized that through a combination of acquiescence
and prescription, an illegal act may at some later point be
accorded some form of legal status. In the law of property, for
example, it is well known that a squatter on land may
ultimately become the owner if the true owner sleeps on his
right to repossess the land. In this way, a change in the factual
circumstances may subsequently be reflected in change in
legal status. It is, however, quite another matter to suggest that
a subsequent condonation of an initially illegal act
retroactively creates a legal right to engage in the act in the
first place. The broader contention is not supported by the
international principle of effectivity or otherwise and must be
rejected.
Secession of Quebec, supra note 3 1, at para. 146.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

Eurasia's "Frozen Conflicts"

Rather, there can be compelling reasons for nonrecognition,
despite effective control. The jurist Sir Hersch Lauterpacht
wrote that nonrecognition "is the minimum of resistance
which an insufficiently organized but law-abiding
community offers to illegality; it is a continuous challenge
to a legal wrong." 77 Non-recognition can be due to policy
reasons or for some legal deficiency of the new entity. For
example, "[r]ecognition may also be withheld where a new
situation originates in an act which is contrary to general
international law.",78 Furthermore, the Restatement (Third)
notes that:
A state has an obligation not to recognize or treat as
a state an entity that has attained the qualification
for statehood as a result of a threat or use of armed
force in violation of the United Nations Charter.79
A frequent reason for not recognizing an entity as a new
state is that territorial changes caused by the use of force
77 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
431 (1947); see also LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW
CASES AND MATERJALS 267 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter DAMROSCH ET
AL.]. In relation to this, one should note that being unrecognized does

not excuse an entity from the norms of international law. The
protection of property rights and of treaty obligations are ensured, as
the rules of State succession still apply. Haverland, supra note 30, at
358.
78 OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, §54, at 183; id. at 184, n.4. As Daniel

Thurer's 1998 addendum on self-determination in the Encyclopedia on
Public International Law further explains
Rather than formally recognizing a right of secession, the
international community seems to have regarded all these
processes of transition as being factual rearrangements of
power, taking place outside the formal structures of
international law: international law only became subsequently
relevant within the context of recognition.
Thurer, supra note 20, at 367.
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, §202(2).
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are generally seen as unlawful and will not be recognized.8 °
Recognition of a territorial acquisition achieved from the
threat or the use of force "would be an improper
interference in the internal affairs of the state of which the
81
unlawfully acquired territory was a part."
A second reason for not recognizing an entity as a state
is its lack of independence in relation to some other state. 82
This argument could be made vis a vis the TMR's
relationship to Russia-but for Russian assistance, the TMR
would probably not be able to survive as a separate entity
as it "relies
heavily on external political and material
83
support."
State practice gives ample support that the nonrecognition of the TMR is consistent with the recent norms
of state practice as well as accepted rules of international
law. The secession of Katanga was not recognized by any
state.84 Biafra was another attempted secession that almost
no other state accepted.85 In light of this, whether the
predecessor state recognizes the seceding entity as a new
state is an important criterion. 86 Where there is an
incomplete secession, the fact that the predecessor state
80

Frowein, supra note 75, at 628.

81

DAMROSCH ET AL, supra note 77, at 267.

See also RESTATEMENT

(THIRD), supra note 8, §202(2).
82 Jochen A. Frowein, Recognition, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 33, 34 (Rudolf. Bernhardt ed., 2000) (stating that

"the reason most frequently used [for non-recognition] is lack of
independence in relation to some State which for political reasons
wants to use the new State which it has helped come into existence.").
83 International Crisis Group [ICG], Moldova: Regional Tensions
Over Transdniestria,at 1, ICG Europe Report No.157 (June 17, 2004)
[hereinafter ICG 2004); see also Bar Report, supra note 9, at 259-60.
84 CRAWFORD, supra note 29,
at 405.
85
Id. at 406 (stating only five states recognized Biafra
unconditionally).
86 Haverland, supra note 30, at 357.
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continues to actively deny the validity of the secession is
both legally and politically important, though not
dispositive. 87
The case of Southern Rhodesia, where a white minority
government took control and declared the colony's
independence from Great Britain, shows that a unilateral
declaration of independence will not be tolerated if the
result would be to then impair the rights of others.8 8 Also,
in the Namibia Case the ICJ implies that if the UN Security
Council finds that a state is "illegal", the members89 of the
UN would be obligated not to recognize that entity.
Cyprus provides a particularly instructive example due
to the combination of different ethnic groups within a
single state, the role of guarantor powers, and the ongoing
question of recognition. In 1960, Cyprus' population was
80% Greek Cypriot, 18% Turkish Cypriot and 2%
87

"Third States ... may be prevented from according recognition as

long as the injured state does not waive its rights since such a unilateral
action would infringe the rights of the latter State." Karl Doehring,
Effectiveness, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 43,
47 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995). While recognition by a predecessor
state is an important criterion, the U.S. has consistently argued that
such recognition is not required as a matter of law. See also Bar
Report, supra note 9, at 259.
88 Brown-John, supra note 28, at 41.
In one basic casebook on
international law, the co-authors explain that Rhodesia should have met
the traditional criteria for statehood, but the Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions denying such recognition were
nonetheless accepted as definitive. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 77, at
266. Great Britain's refusal to accept the validity of Rhodesia's
unilateral declaration of independence, for example, seems to have
played a part in the refusal of any other state to recognize Rhodesia
which thus denied Rhodesia from gaining the capacity to enter into
relations with states. See Ijalaye, supra note 70, at 552.
89
See South West Africa/Namibia, Advisory Opinion, supra note 19,
at paras. 115-123; see also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 232,
n. 25 (University Press 2005) (1989).
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"other". 90

With Britain, Greece, and Turkey playing the
role of "guarantor states," the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities signed a series of agreements in 1960 known
as the 1960 Accords. These Accords included the Treaty of
Guarantee (in which the guarantor States promised to
recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial
integrity and security of Cyprus) as well as the Basic
Structure (effectively, the constitution of the new state) and
the Treaty of Alliance (which set up a means for the
guarantor states to cooperate).
There was disagreement and factionalization almost
from the point of independence. The guarantor powers
unfortunately did more to sow discord than heal wounds: in
1974 Greece engineered a coup in Cyprus and as a response
Turkey invaded and took control of the Northern third of
the island.
In February 1975, the leaders of Turkish Cyprus
announced that they had formed the "Turkish Federated
State of Cyprus," ("TFSC") which was not an independent
sovereign state, but an autonomous part of a federation with
a Greek Cypriot state. 9 1 In this way, Turkish Cyprus
attempted to seize territory first, and then re-negotiate the
constitutional order. This has similarities to MoldovanTransnistrian-Russian relations in the 1990's.
In September 1975, the assembly of the TFSC declared
full sovereignty. Although the TFSC has effective control

90 JEFFREY

L.

DUNOFF, STEVEN

R.

RATNER,

&

DAVID WIPPMAN,

PROCESSES: A PROBLEM
see also David Wippman,
InternationalLaw and Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus, 31 TEX. INT'L L. J.
141, 144 (1996) (stating that "[a]t the time of independence, Greek
Cypriots accounted for eighty percent of the island's population").
91See OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, §55, at 189, n. 16.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS,
ORIENTED APPROACH 38 (2d ed. 2006);
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of northern Cyprus, the TFSC remains generally
unrecognized. 92
While the Security Council did not call for nonrecognition of the island, it did note its regret over the
proclamations of the TFSC and did say that no action
should be taken by any Member State of the UN that would
divide the island.93 The situation further devolved with a
November 1983 proclamation by what had been the TFSC
that the now newly named Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus ("TRNC") was an independent state. Security
Council Resolution 541 (1983) called upon States not to
recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of
Cyprus. 94 Only Turkey has recognized the TRNC and the
Security Council called the proclamation "invalid., 95 This
shows the interplay of the legal doctrine concerning the
attributes of a state and the political reality of membership
in the international community.
Thus, it is not that the TMR is unrecognized merely
because ofpolitics; it is unrecognized by even a single state
in the world because it does not meet the most basic
standards of legality.
However, if Transnistria is not a state, then what is it?
What is the legal ramification of the effective control by the
secessionists over a piece of Moldova?

92

1d. §55, at 189-90.

S.C. Res. 367, para. 1,U.N. Doc. S/RES/367 (March 12, 1975);
see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, §55, at 190.
93

94 S.C. Res. 541, para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/541 (Nov. 18, 1983); see

also S.C. Res. 550, para 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/550 (May 11, 1984).
95 S.C. Res. 541, supra note 93; see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 74,

§55, at 190, n. 20.
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E. The TMR as a De Facto Regime
The incomplete secession of Transnistria can best be
understood by using the doctrine of defacto regimes.
A rebel force may become "so well established in part
of the national territory that, although it has not overthrown
the established government, it is entitled to recognition as a
de facto government, at least in respect of that part of the
national territory under its effective control. 96
Remembering the four criteria for statehood (permanent
population; defined territory; government; capacity to enter
into foreign relations with other states), Dov Lynch argues
that the post-Soviet "de facto states fulfill the first three of
these requirements and claim to pursue the fourth." 97 This

doctrine seems to fit the current facts well: "[e]specially
where civil wars last for a long time or parts of a state
become factually independent without being recognized as
a State, the98 status of de facto regime has gained
acceptance."
Such de facto regimes are treated as partial subjects of
international law. 99 Defacto regimes may undertake normal
acts required for the support of its population. They may
conclude agreements that are held at a status below
96

OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, §49, at 162; see also id, §46, n. 6.

97 LYNCH, supra note 41, at 16.

Frowein, supra note 82, at 40. Examples of de facto states from
various points in recent history include Taiwan, Eritrea, the Republic of
Somaliland, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. LYNCH,
supra note 41, at 19-21. As for the former Soviet space, Abkhazia (in
Georgia), Southern Ossetia (also in Georgia), and Nagorno-Karabakh
(in Azerbaijan) are generally considered de facto regimes. See, e.g.,
98

LYNCH, supra note 41.
99 Jochen A. Frowein, De Facto Regime, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 966 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992)

[hereinafter Frowein, De Facto] (stating "State practice shows that
entities which in fact govern a specific territory will be treated as
partial subject of international law.").
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treaties.100 However, the legal effectiveness of their
decisions is severely curtailed, as any such decisions will
become invalid as a matter of law if the de facto regime is
fully reintegrated into the pre-existing state.' 0 ' If, on the
other hand, the de facto regime becomes
a state, then its
02
acts will be binding on the new state.1
This analysis is further supported by analogy to the law
of belligerent occupation.' 03 If control of territory is gained
by military force, the occupation is considered
belligerent. 104 It is generally accepted that civil wars are an
example of where the law 10of
belligerent occupation can
5
conflict.
domestic
a
apply in
In the law of belligerent occupation, one also draws a
distinction between effectiveness and legality. "The
occupying power's ability to enforce respect for its
legitimate interest is not an authority to create law."' 1 6 An
'oo Id. at 967.
101

Id.(stating "[a]cts of an unsuccessful de facto regime... will

become invalid with the disappearance of the regime.") However, the
reintegrated state after a failed de facto regime may be held liable for
the acts of the de facto regime that were "part of the normal
administration of the territory concerned" on the assumption that such
acts were neutral. Id.at 967-68.
'o'Id. at 967.
103The law of belligerent occupation can trace its roots to the Lieber
Code of 1863 and through the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 to
its modern codification in the Fourth Geneva Convention and
Additional Protocol I. See, Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
104Michael Bothe, Occupation, Belligerent, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 763 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1997).
105 See, e.g., id. at 764-65.
106 Id. at 764.
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occupier is thus considered de facto authority, not de
jure. 07 In the present case, while Moldova is recognized as
having de jure control over Transnistria, the TMR has
become the region's effective occupier, its defacto regime.
Although there is no longer an armed conflict between the
Government of Moldova and the TMR, there is still a state
of occupation.
The law of belligerent occupation makes the occupier
responsible for the well-being of the inhabitants of an
occupied territory; this applies essentially to protecting the
public health and safety.'08 It is not a license to remake the
domestic system; to the contrary, the occupying power
must apply the pre-existing laws of the occupied
territory. 1°9 In a case of secession, of course, it would seem
logical that the seceding entity would want to make new
laws and apply its own rules. But the critical point is that at
issue is an incomplete secession, an attempted breakaway
that has not been successful in garnering recognition from a
single other state. While a successfully seceded entity that
becomes a new state may of course issue new laws, the
TMR's ability to make fundamental changes in Transnistria
is limited inasmuch as it does not have de jure control of
the territory. As any other such occupying power, it thus
''may issue only such laws and decrees which are necessary
from the viewpoint of military security." 110 Otherwise, the
pre-existing laws of Moldova should be applied until the
conflict is resolved.
Besides the right to act in order to support its
population, a defacto regime may also be held responsible
for breaches of international law. Article 9 of the Draft
107 ]d.

108

Id. at 765.

109Id.

110/Id
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Articles on State Responsibility, entitled "Conduct carried
out in the absence or default of the official authorities,"
states:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall
be considered an act of State under international law
if the person or group of persons is in fact
exercising elements of the governmental authority
in the absence or default of the official authorities
and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise
of those elements of authority."'
Thus, a de facto regime must respect human rights and
other rights under international law. In the Advisory
Opinion on South West Africa/Namibia, the ICJ explained
that "Physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or
legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for acts
affecting other States..."012
In summary, the TMR is an unrecognized entity that
has effective control over territory but whose de jure
111

International Law Commission [ILC], Draft Articles on State

Responsibility, art. 9, in

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND
The
COMMENTARIES 348, 348 (James Crawford ed., 2002).

commentary specifies that article 9 does not apply to cases when a
general de facto regime has seized control of a country but does apply
when a de facto regime has seized control of part of a state. Professor
Crawford wrote:
The cases envisaged by article 9 presuppose the existence of a
government in office and of State machinery whose place is
taken by irregulars or whose action is supplemented in certain
cases. This may happen on part of the territory of a State
which is for the time being out of control, or in other specific
circumstances. A general de facto government, on the other
hand, is itself an apparatus of the State, replacing that which
existed previously.
Id. at 115.
112 South West Africa/Namibia, Advisory Opinion, supra note 19 at
para. 118; see also Frowein, De Facto, supra note 98, at 966.
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control is not accepted by any state. The TMR is thus a de
facto regime. While it has the right to undertake the basic
acts required for the care and security of the population
under its effective control, any measures beyond that are
legally suspect and may be unwound by the government of
Moldova if the TMR is reintegrated into the Moldovan
state.
The concept of de facto regimes (and of occupation)
recognizes that who controls a territory is not the whole
story, rather there is a tension between effective control and
legitimate title. We have already seen that the concept of
territory is the overlay of human beliefs and institutions
upon physical geography. 1 3 In secessionist enclaves, this
becomes all the more complex.
F. The Four Geographiesof a SecessionistEnclave
An incomplete secession, such as in the cases of
Transnistria or Abkhazia, turns the secessionist territory
into a geopolitical purgatory; it has neither achieved the
goal of full statehood nor is it still fully within the
sovereign control of the pre-existing state. In considering
these territories, we do not see sovereignty, but rather
something more complex. The Transnistrian example
shows us that secession enclaves need to be described as
having four geographies: physical, political, strategic, and
legal.
The physical geography of a secessionist enclave is the
actual physical territory that is contested. Certain aspects of
the physical geography-rivers, mountain ranges, deserts,
and so on-may act as natural barriers that may assist or
113 James A. Caporaso, Changes in Westphalian Order: Territory,
Public Authority, and Sovereignty, INT'L STUD. REV., Summer 2000, at

I, 7 (stating "[tierritoriality brings together physical space and public
authority").
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impede claims that the territory is part of a unique entity
from the pre-existing state. For Transnistria, the physical
geography is the strip of land between the Nistru River
(with certain
perturbations)
and
the recognized
international border of Ukraine.
The political geography of a secessionist enclave asks
who has effective control of the physical territory. The law
of occupation places responsibilities on the power with
effective control.
Territory is also important for its strategic value. Who
controls a piece of land can affect other conflicts and
struggles in a region. In understanding the interests of the
parties, including any third-party states involved in the
conflict, one needs to appreciate the strategic importance, if
any, of the land in relation to other conflicts.
Finally, there is the concept of legal geography: the
issues of where legitimate title lies and of the legal rights
and responsibilities of the occupants of a particular
territory. Thus the legal geography of a territory may be in
contrast to its political geography. For example, in its
Ilascu decision the ECHR found that "[o]n the basis of all
the material in its possession the Court considers that the
Moldovan Government, the only legitimate government of
the Republic of Moldova under international law, does not
exercise authority over part of its territory, namely that part
which is under effective control of the [TMR]." 114
Similarly, in Cyprus v. Turkey," 5 the ECHR held that the

114

Case of llascu, supra note 48, at para. 330. The State Department

similarly recognizes that the Government of Moldova does not have
control over Transnistria. Moldova 2004 Country Report, supra note 66
(stating that "[tihe Government does not control this region.").
115 Cyprus v. Turkey, 18 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON H.R. 82, 112-20
(1975), and 21 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON H.R 100, 226-34 (1978).
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TFSC (although controlling the6 territory) did not have
jurisdiction in northern Cyprus."
The overlay of these geographies maps the interaction
of law and power: facts "on the ground" versus normative
standards. The international community has focused on the
final status of Kosovo as a bellweather for the relationship
of law and power.
IV
THE RULE OF POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF LAW

A. Contrasting Kosovo
Recent arguments concerning the Transnistria and the
other frozen conflicts have to be understood in light of
Kosovo. As TMR "President" Igor Smirnov complained in
2006, "[c]urrently they are preparing recognition of
Kosovo, but would deny this to Transnistria. If this is a
really fair, universal approach to conflict settlement, it must
be applied also to Transnistria, and Abkhazia, and South
Ossetia, and Nagorny Karabakh. " 7 On February 17, 2008,
the parliament18 of Kosovo declared Kosovo's independence
from Serbia.'

also OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, §55, at 189, n. 15.
TransnistrianPresidentJealous About Kosovo Variant, INFOTAG,

116See
117

Feb. 17, 2006. Similarly, in November 2005, then-Speaker of the
TMNR's Supreme Soviet Grigoriy Marakutsa seemed to think that, in
light of the decision by Kosovo's parliament to seek recognition as an
independent state, the TMR would soon abandon negotiations:
"Parliament may decide to stop talks with Moldova and start building a
fully independent state" he told reporters. Moldova's Rebel Region
May Proclaim Independence, Speaker Says, INTERFAX-UKRAINE, Nov.
24, 2005.
l 8 Full text: Kosovo declaration, BBC News (Feb 17, 2008)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249677.stm.
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International reaction has been mixed, ranging from
formal recognition by the U.S. the U.K., France, Germany,
and certain other EU member states, as well as a host of
other countries, 119 to the reaction of states (besides Serbia)
such as Russia, Romania, Moldova, and Cyprus that have
argued that Kosovo's secession and/or the recognition of
20
that secession would be a breach of international law.'
The majority of states at the time of this writing have
positions someplace in between these two poles. As of June
13, 2008, approximately 43 states have recognized
12 1
Kosovo's
independence.
is whether this should
have any bearing
on the fateAt
of issue
Transnistria.

119 Wikipedia is a useful resource for keeping track of international

reactions to Kosovo's declaration. See, International reaction to the
2008
Kosovo
declaration
of
independence
available
at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of states thathave recognizedthe
Republic of Kosovo [hereinafter List of States].
120
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said concerning a
potential Kosovar secession:
We are speaking here about the subversion of all the
foundations of international law, about the subversion of those
principles which, at huge effort, and at the cost of Europe's
pain, sacrifice and bloodletting have been earned and laid
down as a basis of its existence.
Paul Reynolds, Legalfurore over Kosovo recognition, BBC News (Feb
16, 2008) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7244538.stm.
The Romanian Defense Minister said that such a declaration "is not
in keeping with international law." Romania not to recognize unilateral
Kosovo independence, says minister, ChinaView.cn, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/12/content_7231934.htm.
The Cypriot Foreign Minister warned against the EU "breaking
international law." Harry de Quetteville and Bruno Waterfield, EU-US
showdown with Russia over Kosovo, The Daily Telegraph Online (Dec.
12,
2007)
available
at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
main.jhtml?xml=/news/ 2007/12/ 1/wkosovo I I1 .xml.
121List of States, supra note 119.
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It is no surprise that the Moldovan leadership argues
that the situation in Kosovo is a false analogy. 122 The
United States and other states that have recognized Kosovo
have claimed that it is a special case and cannot be viewed
as precedent for any other conflict. Secretary of State Rice
explained:
The unusual combination of factors found in the
Kosovo situation - including the context of
Yugoslavia's breakup, the history of ethnic
cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo,
and the extended period of UN administration - are
not found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a
special case. Kosovo cannot be seen as precedent
for any other situation in the world today.
By contrast, the Russian Duma issued a statement that read,
in part:
The right of nations to self-determination cannot
justify recognition of Kosovo's independence along
with the simultaneous refusal to discuss similar acts
by other self-proclaimed states, which have

122 See, e.g., Kosovo Experience is No Good for Transnistria-

Voronin, INFOTAG, Feb. 21, 2006.
23
1 U.S.
Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State, statement of
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Washington DC (Feb, 18 2008).
Moreover, in a statement to the UN Security Council following
Kosovo's declaration, British Ambassador John Sawers said:
[T]he unique circumstances of the violent break-up of the
former Yugoslavia and the unprecedented UN administration
of Kosovo make this a sui generis case, which creates no
wider precedent, as all EU member States today agreed.
Ban Ki-moon urges restraint by all sides after Kosovo declares
independence, UN News Centre (Feb. 18, 2008), availableat
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=25659&Cr=Kosovo&
Crl= .
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obtained de 24 facto independence exclusively by
themselves. 1

Even a brief consideration of Kosovo shows that the
material facts concerning the status of Kosovo are quite
125
different from those of the Transnistrian conflict.
Secretary Rice is correct in highlighting that the situation in
Kosovo is the result of numerous factors including the
dissolution of a state (Yugoslavia), the general breakdown
of a region, and the bad acts of the government of the preexisting state (Serbia).
The international administration of Kosovo, due to the
humanitarian disaster that was being caused by the
government of Serbia, is also of crucial importance. While
secessions are primarily an issue of domestic law, Security
Council Resolution 1244, which provided a framework for
UN intervention and for international mediation to resolve
the crisis, internationalized the Kosovo problem using the
Council's Chapter VII powers.126 It also moved Kosovo
from being solely under Serbian sovereignty into the grey
124

As quoted by the NY Times in Nicholas Kulish and C.J. Chivers,

Kosovo Is Recognized but Rebuked by Others, NY TIMES (Feb 19,
2008), availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/1 9/world/europe/
19kosovo.html?pagewanted=2&hp.
125 Many scholars have considered the international legal issues
arising from the situation in Kosovo. The Chicago-Kent Law Review
had a special symposium issue in 2005 on the final status of Kosovo.
Articles included Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Final Status for Kosovo, 80
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2005); Bartram S. Brown, Human Rights,
Sovereignty, and the FinalStatus of Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 235
(2005); and Hajredin Kuci, The Legal and Political Groundsfor, and
the Influence of the Actual Situation on, the Demand of the Albanians
of Kosovo for Independence, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (2005). See
also Paul Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the
Conflict over Kosovo's FinalStatus, 31 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 387
(2003).
126 S.C. Res 1244 (10 June 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/
Kosovo/docu/u9906 IOa.htm.
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zone of international administration. Although this area of
international law is not sharply defined, reintegrating such
a territory is different from assessing a claim by a separatist
group that, on its own, is seeking to overturn the authority
of the pre-existing state and unilaterally secede.
None of the material factors in the Kosovo case apply
to Moldova. Consequently, applying these facts to the
"extreme cases" framework that is used by some jurists to
analyze claims of external self-determination leads to a
different result than in the case of Transnistria. While there
is an open question as to whether the Kosovar Albanians
are a nation unto themselves, they are clearly a distinct
people from the Serb majority of the rest of Serbia.
Moreover, the Serbs were responsible for serious human
rights abuses against the Kosovars, culminating in the
commencement of ethnic cleansing which instigated
NATO's intervention.
As for whether there is a
reconciliation possible such that secession from Serbia is
not the only option, as of December 2007, the two sides
could not seem to resolve their differences and the Troika
has declared the political negotiations a failure. Thus, based
on at least a cursory consideration, there seems to be a
much stronger argument for recognizing the independence
of Kosovo as opposed to supporting the sovereignty claim
of Transnistria.
That being said, one should note that states that support
Kosovo's declaration emphasize that they view the
situation as unique. As of this writing, the United States nor
other major recognizing states have used the argument that
Kosovo is owed sovereignty as a legal right. Consequently,
they make no claim to be applying the framework
described above. In short, it is too early to tell whether, as
a matter of law, the events in Kosovo will lead to a shift in
legal interpretation. Regardless, Kosovo has already started
to play a role in the evolving political rhetoric of parties
involved in secessionist conflicts. So, while there is not (as
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of yet) a Kosovo "precedent" in international law, there is
now, based on the reactions of the TMR and other
secessionist entities, as well as Russia, a Kosovo argument
in international diplomacy.
B. Law and Politics in Arguments About Sovereignty
Some commentators look at the frozen conflicts or the
question of the status of Kosovo, and ask whether law has
any role in the middle of a fractious political argument.
Law and politics are intertwined in such cases. States tend
to deploy arguments based on international law when such
arguments favor their national interests. So, for example,
Russia, which has supported the TMR in the face of
arguments of Moldovan sovereignty, turns to international
law in the case of Kosovo and argues that any
such
27
law.
international
of
violation
a
be
would
secession
Certain EU member states--Cyprus, Greece, Romania,
Slovakia and Spain-have also each expressed their
reservations at recognizing Kosovar independence. 128
Romanian Defense Minister Teodor Melescanu said at a
press conference in Serbia that "A unilateral decision [for
an independent Kosovo] could have a very negative effect
on the entire region and is not in keeping with international
law."' 29 With the possible exception of Slovakia, each of
127

See Associated Press, Serbia to Challenge Kosovo Independence,

Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?idNEWEN20070035617&ch=12/I I/2007%206:32:00%20PM
(concerning Serbia's use of international legal arguments, apparently
coordinated with Russia, concerning the status of Kosovo).
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these countries is grappling with some type of secessionist
issue in its own domestic politics. For example, Romania
not only has had good diplomatic relations with Serbia but
also does not want to inadvertently support any claim for
secession by the ethnic Hungarian population in Romanian
Transylvania. For them, then, reference to international
legal norms disfavoring secession has been part of their
diplomatic stance concerning Kosovo.' 30 So it is in each of
their national interests to hold off on Kosovar
independence, regardless as to whether or not international
law would allow "external" self-determination in that case.
Thus, law is deployed as a diplomatic tool because of
political deadlock, not in spite of it. In both the
Transnistrian case and in the case of Kosovo, realpolitik
has run its course for years. In neither case has there been a
solution based on pure political haggling. However, in both
cases, a legal framework exists for assessing such claims of
sovereignty. Thus, while there is the rule of politics in such
issues, perhaps there is a role for law to clarify the strength
of claims based on the standards of the international
community.
Martti Koskenniemi analyzed this interplay of law and
politics in his magisterial work, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA. According to his nomenclature, "descending
patterns" of justification take as a given a normative order
that is prior to the state and frames how a state may behave.
Conversely, "ascending patterns" attempt to construct a
normative order on "factual" state behavior, will and
interest. 131 An argument can be ascending or descending,
but it cannot be both. 32 Applying this analysis to
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/12/content_7231934.htm.
130 Romania opposes Kosovo independence, Serbianna (March 30,
2007), availableat http://news.serbianunity.net/2007/03/30/2019/.
131

KOSKENNIEMI,

132

id.

supra note 89, at 59.
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arguments about sovereignty, Koskenniemi contrasts the
descending view in which "law is normative and
'sovereignty' merely a descriptive shorthand for the rights,
liberties, and competences which the law has allocated to
the State," with the ascending view in which "sovereignty
is a matter of fact-description
and law a normative
33
thereof."'
consequence
Koskenniemi calls the two archetypal approaches to
international sovereignty the "legal approach" and the
"pure fact approach." Under the legal approach sovereignty
is determined by law; "[t]he legal order pre-exists the
134
sovereignty of the State and remains in control thereof."
Consequently "the criteria for the emergence and
dissolution of States are not simply questions of fact but
established by a rule of law.' 35 He notes that many UN
instruments and documents, such as the Draft Declaration
on the Rights and Duties of States and the Friendly
Relations Declaration, use the rhetoric of the legal
approach.136 By contrast, under what he calls the "pure
fact" approach, "sovereignty is external to international
law, a normative fact with which law must accommodate
itself."' 137
Koskenniemi argues that the sovereignty
doctrine is based on neither one nor the other solely, but
rather oscillates between two. 138 For example, "the 'pure
facts' of geography or geology have seemed powerless for
creating title unless accompanied by general recognition."
Koskenniemi further explains:

33

' d.at 227.

134Id.at 228.
131Id. at

229.

136id.at 231,
117Id.at 231.
138 id.

n. 20.
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It is immediately evident that effective possession
cannot constitute an exhaustive rule on what is
needed to show title. Not all factual possession
results in sovereignty. It seems reasonably clear that
illegal occupation, however effective, cannot per se
create title. But law cannot interminably divorce
itself from fact. Therefore, it is assumed that
original illegality may be corrected in a process of
consolidation, that is, the passing of time during
which it becomes generally accepted to be best to
139
let sleeping dogs lie - quieta non sunt movere.
Thus, neither the pure fact approach nor the legal approach
alone is sufficient, rather there is an oscillation between the
two. 14° While this may point to difficulties of legal

argumentation, I believe that it also shows the pragmatism
involved applying international legal norms to contentious
situations.
V
RECONSIDERING WESTPHALIA

The frozen conflicts and the status of Kosovo are
intensely political disagreements. But, although these are
political matters-if anything because these are contentious
political matters-legal principles and due process are all
the more important. As one roundtable of legal and political
experts noted, "the United States should be less concerned
about outcomes in these struggles than about the means
used; international political stability is more likely to be
maintained by focusing on the process than by trying to

manipulate events to arrange a predetermined outcome." 41
"9ld. at 284-85.
140 Id. at 286.
141 Carley,

supra note 10 at vi. The United States should, however,
make absolutely clear that secession has not been universally
recognized as an international right. It may choose, on the basis of
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This Article has set out the international legal
framework for addressing situations as diverse as the
situation in Moldova, the conflict in Abkhazia, and the
status of Kosovo. While each of these cases have different
material facts, the general legal claims have to do with the
interplay of sovereignty, self-determination, and territory.
While international law has a framework for analyzing such
issues, the question that remains is whether it is a useful
and just framework.
International institutions such as the U.N. have a
membership of states and thus are biased against allowing
secessions. 142 Some have argued that the rules of the
international legal system should be revised so that states
are no longer favored and that it becomes easier to redraw
boundaries to unite co-nationals. For them, the time of
Westphalia has passed and we must build something new.
Such calls are understandable, given the iniquities of
international law such that certain claims, such as those of
the Kurds, are systematically undercut. However, although
the current balancing between territorial integrity and
external self-determination may favor territorial integrity, it
is nonetheless preferable to a hypothesized system which
allows for an easier ratification of secession.
other interests, to support the secessionist claims of a selfdetermination movement, but not because the group is exercising its
right to secession, since no such right exists in international law. At the
same time, an absolute rejection of secession in every case is unsound,
because the United States should not be willing to tolerate another
state's repression or genocide in the name of territorial integrity.
Secession can be a legitimate aim of some self-determination
movements, particularly in response to gross and systematic violations
of human rights and when the entity is potentially politically and
economically viable. Id. at vii.
142 David B. Knight, People Together, Yet Apart: Rethinking
Territory, Sovereignty, and Identities, in REORDERING THE WORLD:
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 2 iST CENTURY 209, 219 (George
J. Demko & William B. Wood eds., 2d ed. 1999).
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As a method of ordering international relations, there is
no principled reason to favor nationhood over statehood.
Both are more akin to social constructs than independent
facts. 143 What makes a Serb different from a Croat
different from a Bosnian or a "Transnistrian" from a
Moldovan is as much that they are told they are different by
their political leaders than any actual social or physical
divergences. This is also true for some of the national
movement from the 1 9 th century. Ironically nationalism,
one of the factors that helped the formation of nationsstates in the 19 th century, is now being used to undercut the
modem state system. 144 The rise of ethnic demands in the
1990s in the years after World War II may have been a
and consolidations of
reaction of statewide modernizations
45
governments.1
national
by
power
Upending the international legal system to favor nations
over states would not be more just, it would simply bias
one set of social constructs (nations) over another (states).
Moreover, in both the transition to this new rule and in the
aftermath of the adoption of such a rule, the world would
likely be more chaotic and insecure.
The current system is not ideal. It is at times unjust.
But it is in all probability a better system than one which
would make it easier to secede and start new states. While a
Two views of national identity include the essentialist view,
which believes that nations are organic and one's nationality is an
inherent characteristic, and the constructivist perspective, which views
nations as "1) the product of structural change; 2) the project of elites;
3) a discourse of domination; and 4) a bounded community of
143

exclusion and opposition." Herb, supra note 33, at 14.
144 See id. (arguing that the structural change of modernization and
advanced capitalism eroded community bonds and nationalism
provided the glue for these new societies). But note also that others
argue state-building preceded nationalism, leading to the quip from the
191h century: "We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians."
145 Knight, supra note 142, at
220.
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refashioned system that would emphasize the law of
"peoples" rather than "states" may be rhetorically
charming, it is politically na'fve, if not dangerous. Consider
the resource problems, coordination breakdowns, and
conflicts among 195 existing UN member states. Now
consider that there are several thousand groups that have a
realistic claim to be ethnic "nations" (not taking into
account the number of groups that may have unrealistic
claims, but would do so anyway). 146 As two geographers
put it: "a world political map of nations would be very
different and much more volatile than today's version made
up of sovereign states and traditionally defined country
boundaries..."' 47 In a world of over a thousand national
problems would be
statelets, the coordination
overwhelming and conflict constant.
The rhetoric implies that a world in which ethnic or
state-based
to
opposed
bonds-as
communal
communities-are preferred would lead to a more just
world. But we have seen in Iraq what can happen when we
let bonds devolve down to the purely communal.
The Westphalian system is without a doubt undergoing
transformation. The rising power on the world stage of nongovernmental organizations, corporations, supranational
organizations such as the EU, and also of individuals means
that states are no longer the sole actors. They are still the
major players, but also members of a large and varied cast.
The rules of self-determination were written by staterepresentatives and they are admittedly protective of the
prerogatives of states. These are rules not to facilitate
secession, but to provide a framework for the protection of
146

William B. Wood & George J.Demko, Introduction: Political

Geography for the Next Millennium, in REORDERING THE WORLD:
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minority rights within a (more or less) stable scaffolding of
states.
But it is one thing to describe that the Westphalian
system is evolving and quite another to argue that it should
be done away with. Such an argument requires more than
rhetorical persuasion. It needs some solid examples to show
how allowing the easy dismemberment of states will foster
peace, justice, and stability. Because any new ordering of
the world will seem unjust to some and will prompt a new
reordering. Each nationality can be subdivided again and
again and again.
This struggle for a new world after Westphalia may
well be the defining struggle of our time. Compared to
tribes, kingdoms, and empires, states are a comparatively
recent invention. 148 Although the "origins of states can be
traced back thousands of years and are customarily linked
to warfare, the production of food surpluses, or the need to
organize irrigation schemes,"' 149 it is important to remember
that for the better part of human history, humanity has
ordered itself by other means than the modem state. Yet,
while in their rise to geopolitical primacy states "have
crushed all opposition, from empires to tribal
confederations... [Some
would argue that that] control is
150
end."'
an
to
coming
It is more than that a wider variety of actors, from
individuals to corporations to supranational bodies, take
part in world politics; that is a transformation of the
Westphalian system that is in many cases benign, or at least
one in which we can see how positive results can be used to
counteract destructive ones.
148 MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 192

(1991).
149 Herb, supra note 33, at 10.
150 JOHN ROBB, BRAVE NEW WAR 16 (2007).
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The more troubling aspect of the transformation of the
international system is that a wider variety of actors are
able to deploy the type of armed violence that had
previously been the sole preserve of states. 15 1 As national
security analyst John Robb explained:
Nonstate actors in the form of terrorist, crime
syndicates, gangs, and networked tribes are stepping
into the breach to lay claim to areas that were once
the sole control of states. It is this conflict, the war
between states and non-states, that is the basis
for
152
the first epochal or long war of this century.
This darker vision of a post-Westphalian future, one in
which secessionist entities, armed gangs, and terrorist
groups (at times indistinguishable) fight for control is what
we see in failed states and conflict zones around the world,
ranging from Iraq to Chechnya to Somalia to Haiti.
Nonstate actors struggle with each other and with states for
a greater share of the spoils of territorial and resource
control. Recalling the observations of Robert Kaplan at the
opening of this article, we are moving in many parts of the
world from an era of state frontiers to opportunistic
roadblocks based on local power. The withering away and
failure of the Westphalian state in these places does not
bring on some new just order based on peoples. It heralds
deprivation, strife, and war.
In the corners of the world which are rarely on the front
pages of Western newspapers, people like the TMR
leadership use the garb of nationalism to dress up corrupt
power grabs. As one author put it:
151 VAN CREVELD, supra note 148, at 195-96.
152 ROBB, supra note 150, at 17; see also id. at 197 (stating future

wars by groups we today call "terrorists, guerillas, bandits, and
robbers," who will be organized along charismatic lines as opposed to
the formal bureaucracy of the modem state).

OREGON REVIEW OF INT'L LAW

[Vol. 9,2007]

The tendency of nations to stress antagonisms
against other groups is dependent on the strength of
their internal cultural content. Nations with few
ethnic markers or core values, of which a shared
language is the most common
element, are more
53
prone to resort to violence. 1
Accepting for a moment the "nation" terminology, this is
the situation of the TMR: a group that can mostly point to a
common language, which maintains internal coherence by
fostering a "frozen" conflict with an "Other"-Moldovans
from the other side of the Nistru River.
Post-Westphalian Optimists seek a new and just world
order. That is commendable, but the reality we see today is
that nature abhors a vacuum. If state power is absent, other
forms of power rush in to occupy the same space. The
winners are not the mostjust but the best armed. The ills of
the early Westphalian system are recapitulated.
But the Westphalian system as it exists has evolved
such that there is an overlay of legal norms mediating the
relation of states. This legal system presupposes the
existence of a state system and for its proper functioning, it
has defined rules concerning secession that protects the
existence of states. Geographical concepts such as territory
and borders are used to this end. There will always be a
tension between politics and law, pure fact versus legalistic
approaches. But equilibria can be dynamic and such an
oscillation between law and politics can allow for a greater
stability.
With the rise of international institutions (on the one
hand) and private power (on the other), today's
international system bears little resemblance to the original
political bargain of 1648. Westphalia is dead. But states are
still the core of the increasingly complicated international
153

Herb, supra note 33, at 15-16.
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system and, absent any showing of a viable alternative, are
still the best hope for broad-based approaches to peace and
justice. Long live Westphalia.

